The interdependency of information security risks often induces firms to invest inefficiently in IT security management. Cyberinsurance has been proposed as a promising solution to help firms optimize security spending. However, cyberinsurance is ineffective in addressing the investment inefficiency caused by risk interdependency. In this paper, we examine two alternative risk management approaches: risk pooling arrangements (RPAs) and managed security services (MSSs). We show that firms can use an RPA as a complement to cyberinsurance to address the overinvestment issue caused by negative externalities of security investments; however, the adoption of an RPA is not incentive-compatible for firms when the security investments generate positive externalities. We then show that the MSS provider (MSSP) serving multiple firms can internalize the externalities of security investments and mitigate the security investment inefficiency. As a result of risk interdependency, collective outsourcing arises as an equilibrium only when the total number of firms is small.
Introduction
In the network economy, product innovation and value creation are achieved via networks of firms, operating on large scales. The scope of information technology has been expanding beyond the traditional organizational boundaries [17; 39] . As a result, information security risks have become intricately interdependent. For example, inter-organizational information systems essentially physically connect firms' IT infrastructure via the Internet and expose the participating firms to network-wide security risks. An organization's network is at risk if a hacker gains access to its partner's network. Even firms without close business relationships may be logically interdependent: Strategic hackers often evaluate the security level of firms and select their targets on the basis of whose systems they can break into quickly without being detected [34] . In these examples, a firm's security risks depend not only on its own security practices, but also on the security protections of others.
Firms' security risks can be either positively interdependent or negatively interdependent.
The security risk is defined as the probability for a firm to have a security incident. Positive interdependency occurs when a company has higher security risks while other companies also have higher security risks. For example, a security threat that impacts a firm may also influence the firm's partners via the interorganizational information systems. The hacker who breaks into the firm's network may steal sensitive data about the partners or penetrate the partners' networks via the trust connections. The security risks of the firm and its partners are thus positively interdependent. With positive interdependency, a firm's security investment not only strengthens its protection, but also reduces the likelihood that other firms have security breaches. The security investments therefore generate positive externalities [20; 31] .
Negative interdependency occurs when a company has higher security risks while other 6 to address the investment inefficiency and whether the self-interested firms have incentives to adopt these solutions. An RPA is a mutual form of insurance organization in which the policyholders are also the owners. Mutual insurance was widely adopted in the insurance market for medical malpractice and municipal liability during the late 1980s [23] and has since also been used in other lines of insurance, such as employee pension and employee health insurance. The traditional advantages of an RPA over commercial insurance include tax benefits, reduced overhead expenses, and flexible policy development [40] .
RPAs are different from third-party cyberinsurance in terms of risk transfer. RPAs can never completely eliminate the risks for an individual policyholder. Even though the risk pool can issue full coverage for the firms' security losses, each individual firm still bears part of the risk pool's loss through its equity position. Table 1 compares cyberinsurance and RPAs.
[Please Insert Table 1 Here.]
We find that even though an RPA endogenizes the network externalities of security investments for firms, the adoption of the RPA is incentive-compatible for firms only when security investments generate negative externalities. The key reason is that by pooling the risks of individual firms, the RPA induces moral hazard in teams, which refers to firms' reluctance to invest in loss prevention when they can transfer security losses to others [15] . This type of moral hazard is shown to be desirable when security investments generate negative externalities.
However, in the case of positive externalities, moral hazard further reduces the firms' investment incentives and exacerbates the underinvestment problem.
The second solution is MSSs, or IT security outsourcing. MSS providers (MSSPs) provide a range of security services, such as security monitoring and vulnerability assessments; network protection and penetration testing; managed spam services; anti-virus and content filtering 7 services; incident management and forensic analysis; data archiving and restoration; and on-site audits and consulting [1; 3] . The 2010-2011 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey reported that as many as 36% of respondents outsourced part or all of their computer security functions to MSSPs. In addition, 14.1% of respondents indicated that their companies outsourced more than 20% of their security functions [5] . The global MSS market is forecasted to more than double between 2011 and 2015, when it will reach $16.8 billion [18] .
We show that MSSs can address investment inefficiency caused by both positive and negative externalities of security investments when the total number of firms is small. Using MSSs with a service level agreement (SLA), firms not only delegate the security operations but also transfer their security risks to MSSPs. Because the MSSP collectively manages the interdependent security risks for multiple client firms, it can internalize the externalities of security investments. However, collective outsourcing may not always arise as an equilibrium because of the interdependent nature of security risks. When the total number of firms is large, an individual firm can leverage the MSSP's collective operations for others and receive a higher payoff by managing security in-house. Even if the MSSP is better able to manage security (i.e., is more cost-efficient in managing security) than the firms, this result still holds. This paper characterizes the condition under which all firms will adopt the MSS solution.
This paper contributes to the research on alternative risk transfer (ART) solutions. RPAs, as an ART approach, have been recognized by practitioners as having the advantages of reduced overhead expense and flexible policy development [40] . We find that, in addition to these advantages, RPAs can serve as a potential solution to investment inefficiency caused by interdependent security risks and can optimize firms' security spending. This finding helps policy makers recognize the potential benefit of RPAs in security management and guide the 8 development of policies for the mutual insurance industry. This paper also contributes to the literature on IT security outsourcing. It has been well recognized that firms outsourcing security services can benefit from cost savings, reduced staffing needs, broader skills acquisition, security awareness, dedicated facilities, liability protection, and round-the-clock service [1] . We illustrate that the use of MSSs can also be justified from the perspective of mitigating the investment inefficiency caused by risk interdependency.
The rest of the paper organized as follows: In the next section, we review related literature on the economics of information security, cyberinsurance, RPAs, and MSSs. We then outline the model setup, followed by the analysis of the cyberinsurance, RPAs, and MSSs solutions. We also extend the model to account for heterogeneous firms. Finally, we draw managerial and policy implications and conclude this paper with future extensions.
Related Literature
Researchers in prior studies on the economics of information security have examined many issues related to information security investments [e.g., 14, 16] . Anderson and Moore [2] discussed how moral hazard and adverse selection distort firms' incentives to invest in information security. Gordon and Loeb [10] developed an economic model to determine the optimal level of investment in information security. Gal-Or and Ghose [9] examined firms' incentives to share security information and showed that information sharing and security investment complement each other. Kunreuther and Heal [20] characterized a class of interdependent security risks and demonstrated that firms generally underinvest in security protections when their security risks are interdependent. Our paper complements this stream of research by exploring risk management solutions to the investment inefficiency associated with interdependent information security risks. 9 There is an emerging body of literature that has examined the use of insurance in information security management. Gordon et al. [12] discussed the advantages of using cyberinsurance to manage information security risks. Ogut et al. [31] used an economic model to examine firms' investments in security protections and the use of cyberinsurance in the context of interdependent security risks. They showed that interdependence of security risks reduces firms' incentives to invest in security technologies and to buy insurance coverage. All of these studies focused on third-party commercial cyberinsurance, whereas in this paper, we propose and examine two alternative risk management approaches to information security risks: RPAs and MSSs.
Prior literature on risk management has justified the existence of RPAs from various perspectives. For example, the mutual form of insurance organization is more efficient when the distribution of risks prevents independent insurers from using the law of large numbers to eliminate risks [8; 25] . The mutual form of insurance can also address the conflicts of interest between insurers and policyholders because policyholders themselves are the owners of a mutual insurer [7; 26; 27] . Moreover, mutual insurers can coexist with independent insurers as a result of the adverse selection of risk-averse policyholders [23] . This paper complements these studies by illustrating the use of mutual insurance to endogenize network externalities of security investments.
Our work is also related to prior work on contracting in IT outsourcing, especially IT security outsourcing. Richmond et al. [33] analytically characterized the conditions under which an organization outsources its software enhancements, considering information asymmetry and different profit-sharing rules. Whang [45] proposed a contract for outsourcing software development that achieves the outcome of in-house development. Wang et al.
[44] characterized 10 the efficiency loss resulting from investment externalities for both in-house software development and outsourced custom software development. Sen et al. [37] proposed a dynamic, priority-based, price-penalty scheme for outsourcing IT services and found that it is more effective than a fixed-price approach. IT security outsourcing has not received adequate research attention until recently. Allen et al. [1] , Axelrod [3] and McQuillan [25] provided organizations with general guidance to help them knowledgeably engage MSSPs. Gupta and Zhdanov [13] analytically explained the growth and sustainability of MSSP networks and found that the initial investment is critical in determining the size of MSS networks with positive externalities. In their setting, the issue of free-riding never occurred. Our paper examines the use of MSSs to address interdependent information security risks that often lead to free-riding. Hui et al. [16] examined both an MSSP and its clients' equilibrium effort decisions when risk interdependency arose among the MSSP's clients. In our paper, firms' security risks are interdependent even though firms do not use an MSSP. Lee et al. [17] proposed a multi-lateral contract to solve the double moral hazard issues between the client firm and the MSSP. Our paper complements this stream of research by examining the use of IT security outsourcing to address the investment inefficiency caused by interdependent information security risks among firms.
Model
We consider n risk-averse firms. Each firm has an initial wealth A . All firms have an
The assumption of an increasing and concave utility function is consistent with the literature on risk management (e.g., [22; 24; 35; 38] ). Firms invest in security protection to safeguard their information assets. As we discussed in the Introduction, 11 security investments often generate network externalities. The breach probability for an individual firm, firm i , is affected not only by its own security investment, but also by the security investments of others. We let   
It is assumed that the investment cost is linear in the investment level. In particular, the investment cost is equal to the investment level. The qualitative insights still hold if the investment cost is an increasing and convex function of the investment level. A firm's security investment decreases its breach probability and the investment exhibits a diminishing marginal return in reducing the breach probability. That is,
The assumption about the declining marginal return of the security investment is consistent with the CERT incident data [30] and is widely used in the literature on security management (e.g., [4; 10; 11] ).
We consider two types of network externalities: positive externalities and negative externalities. In the case of positive externalities, a firm's security investment, while decreasing its breach probability, also decreases the breach probability of other firms (i.e.,
In the case of negative externalities, a firm's security investment increases the breach probability of other firms (i.e.,
ij  ). Table 2 summarizes and compares the features of different network externalities.
[Please Insert Table 2 Here.]
Although firms' security risks are interdependent, a firm's security investment generally has a greater effect on its own security than on other firms' security. We therefore assume that:
In addition, we assume that
Condition (2) requires that the second-order effect of a firm's security investment on its breach probability dominates the aggregate second-order effect of other firms' investments on its breach probability. These conditions reflect the reality that, even though security risks are interdependent in cyberspace, a firm's security investment is still an effective strategy for self-protection.
Third-Party Cyberinsurance
We establish the benchmark case in which firms use cyberinsurance to cover their security risks.
We assume that firms can buy an insurance policy from the cyberinsurance market to cover their security losses. In practice, before issuing insurance policies, insurance companies often formally audit the client firms to ensure that firms take proper actions to protect themselves. Therefore, we assume that the security investment is observable to the insurers. The same assumption has been used in the literature [31] .
The timing of events is as follows: (1) Each firm chooses its security investment In this paper, we consider a mature insurance market in which firms are charged an 13 actuarially fair premium. When firm i purchases an insurance policy with coverage i I , the insurance premium is
. Firm i 's optimization problem can be represented by: 
To evaluate the investment efficiency, we compare the firms' investment levels in the cyberinsurance-only case with the optimal investment level. The optimal investment level is defined as the security investment level when all firms jointly maximize their total payoffs. It is equivalent to the case that a central decision maker maximizes the joint payoff and determines the investment levels for all firms. We next examine the central decision maker's problem: 
In the symmetric case, we have
the optimal level of security investment for firm i in the centralized case, and
In the case of negative externalities, because
eo ii xx  Therefore, the firms overinvest when the security investments generate negative externalities and underinvest when the security investments generate positive externalities.
In the cyberinsurance-only case, we find that when security investments generate negative (positive) externalities, firms purchase full insurance (i.e., e i IL  ) and invest more (less) than the optimal level. These results are in line with the findings in the existing literature [20; 31] .
Even though commercial cyberinsurance can hedge firms' risks, it cannot internalize the externalities of security investments and therefore is incapable of resolving either the overinvestment or underinvestment issues. A fine for liability has been proposed to address the investment inefficiency issues caused by the interdependent security risks. This mechanism requires the liable firm to compensate the loss that it causes to other firms. As a result, a self-interested firm will consider the impact of its investment on other firms' security [20; 31] .
However, a fine for liability between firms is difficult to enforce. Because the Internet has no clear delineation of jurisdiction, the imposition of liability across countries by enforcement powers (e.g., governments, regulatory agencies, or trade associations) is extremely costly, if not impossible. We next examine other risk management approaches-RPA or MSSs-that can be 15 used to address the investment inefficiency caused by risk interdependency.
Risk Pooling Arrangements
In this section, we examine the use of RPAs in addressing interdependent risks. We use
to denote the ratio of loss covered by the risk pool. When a firm suffers a security loss of L , the mutual insurer compensates the firm qL . Because the firms are the equity holders of the mutual insurer, the total security losses collected by the mutual insurer are then shared equally among all the firms. If 1 q  , the firms transfer only partial losses to the mutual insurer. The compensation from an RPA is modeled as follows [22] . Assume that k firms out of When the RPA does not cover all the risks, firms can purchase third-party cyberinsurance in addition to using an RPA. The principle of indemnity 1 requires that the cyberinsurance coverage 1 The principle of indemnity is an insurance principle stating that an insured may not be compensated by the insurance companies 16 satisfies the constraint that i I qL L  ; that is, the total insurance compensation from both the RPA and the cyberinsurance cannot exceed the total loss. In the symmetric case, firm i 's expected payoff can be represented by:
the binomial probability that k out of 1 n  firms have security breaches. Proposition 1 characterizes the complementary relationship between the RPA and the cyberinsurance.
Proposition 1 When firms use both an RPA and third-party cyberinsurance, we have
. That is, if the risk pool does not provide full coverage, firms will buy third-party insurance to cover the residual risks. 2 Proposition 1 shows that risk-averse firms always choose to hedge against all risks. If the risk pool covers only part of a firm's risks (i.e., 1 q  ), the firm will use the cyberinsurance to cover the residual risks. Thus, firm i 's expected payoff can be represented by:
in an amount exceeding the insured's economic loss. Therefore, a firm is not allowed to purchase insurance coverage from multiple insurers resulting in an amount of compensation or payout that is higher than the total economic loss [35] . 2 The proofs of lemmas and propositions are available upon request.
When a firm uses only cyberinsurance, it purchases full coverage ( i IL  ) and completely transfers its risks to the cyberinsurance market. However, if firms adopt an RPA, they still retain part of the risks because they are equity holders of the risk pool (i.e., the mutual insurance entity).
Presumably, a risk-averse firm always wants to minimize its risk exposure and prefers the third-party cyberinsurance to the RPA. However, in the context of interdependent security risks, cyberinsurance may not be superior because it cannot address network externalities of security investments. The question is whether, given interdependent security risks, firms have an incentive to use RPAs as a complement to cyberinsurance. We show next that the RPA solution is incentive-compatible for firms in the case of negative externalities but not in the case of positive externalities.
Negative Externalities
We first examine how the use of an RPA in addition to cyberinsurance influences firms' security investments and payoffs when negative externalities exist. consideration the negative effect of its security investments on others and thus invests less. The second is the moral hazard effect. The RPA allows a firm to transfer its security loss to others, which also dampens the firm's investment incentives (i.e., a firm would like to free ride on other firms because of moral hazard in teams [15] ). In the case of negative externalities, firms have excess incentives to invest in security. The moral hazard effect helps mitigate the overinvestment incentive and hence strengthens the internalization effect. Therefore, firms invest less in security protections when they participate in an RPA.
Proposition 3: When security investments generate negative externalities, participating in an
Proposition 3 generates an important implication: When firms overinvest because of the negative externalities of their security investments, they have the incentives to adopt an RPA as a complement to the third-party cyberinsurance. In other words, individual firms are willing to pool their security risks using an RPA in addition to purchasing cyberinsurance. To better explain this incentive compatibility, we derive the marginal effect of q on firm i 's expected 19 The first term of Eq. (8) The first two terms cancel out in a symmetric equilibrium. Because Therefore, the security investments in the optimal case and the cyberinsurance case are increasing in n. The higher negative effect with larger n also leads to a wider gap between the optimal investment and the investment in the cyberinsurance-only case. Specifically, as the number of firms increases, each individual firm's security investment in the cyberinsurance-only case further deviates from the optimal level. RPAs can effectively mitigate firms' overinvestment
incentives. An individual firm's security investment is significantly lower in the RPA case than in the cyberinsurance-only case. Relative to the investment in the cyberinsurance-only case, the investment in the RPA case comes closer to the optimal level. Figure 1(b) compares the firm's expected payoffs in the cyberinsurance-only case, the RPA case, and the optimal case. The curves show that relative to the cyberinsurance-only case, the firm's expected payoff in the RPA case is much closer to the optimal payoff. Figure 1(c) illustrates the optimal ratio of loss that firms allocate to the risk pool. The proportion of the loss allocated to the risk pool increases as the number of firms in the pool increases. When the number of firms increases, firms have more incentives to overinvest because of the higher negative aggregate effect of security investments by other firms. Firms allocate more risks to the risk pool to better leverage the internalization and moral hazard effects and to mitigate overinvestment. Figure 1 thus illustrates that an RPA is an effective solution to the investment inefficiency caused by the negative externalities of security investments.
Positive Externality
The preceding subsection demonstrates that when security investments generate negative , which ensures that the externality is positive. In addition, the aggregate impact of others' security investments is lower than that of the firm's own security investment.
Three increasing and concave payoff functions are examined. They are
which represent different degrees of concavity of the firms' payoffs. We did not find any parameter space in which firms have an incentive to set up a risk pool. Therefore, the incentive-compatibility of the RPA solution is difficult to achieve in the case with positive externalities of security investments.
Managed Security Services (MSSs)
In the previous section, we showed that the effectiveness of RPAs depends on the nature of security risks. The RPA solution is effective in addressing overinvestment issues associated with negatively interdependent risks. However, it cannot address the underinvestment issues associated with positively interdependent risks. In this section, we examine a different security management solution: MSSs (or security management outsourcing). We first assume that the MSS provider (i.e., the MSSP) has the same level of security expertise as the firms. This assumption enables us to highlight the insight that the use of MSSs can be justified from the perspective of risk interdependencynot on the basis that the MSSP is more cost-efficient than the client firms. We later extend the analysis and study the case that the MSSP has a cost advantage.
If a firm uses MSSs, it pays a fixed fee, denoted by t, to the MSSP. We refer to the firms using MSSs as the member firms and the firms not using MSSs as non-member firms. In practice, 24 an SLA is often used to ensure that the MSSP assumes accountability for the security loss and manages the security for the member firms' benefits. In this paper, we assume that the SLA specifies the compensation level that the MSSP pays to a member firm if the latter suffers a security loss. We denote the compensation level as d.
The timing of events is as follows. (1) The MSSP announces the service fee, t; (2) firms decide whether or not to use the MSSs; (3) the MSSP invests in security protections for the member firms, and the non-member firms obtain the expected reservation payoff, s U ; and (4) the security losses are realized and the compensations are made according to the SLAs.
Because firms are homogeneous, we focus on the symmetric case in which all firms choose the same strategies. The MSSP's problem can be formulated as:
Constraint (9) ensures that a firm has a higher payoff when outsourcing security management to the MSSP than when it manages security in-house and achieves the reservation payoff. Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal compensation level that the MSSP will establish.
Lemma 1: The loss compensation d satisfies that dL  .
When a member firm has a security breach and losses L , the MSSP compensates the firm to the level of d . Because the member firms are risk averse but the MSSP is risk neutral, the MSSP is willing to provide full insurance to the member firms. As a result, the member firms transfer all security risks to the MSSP. In this regard, the MSSP serves as a third-party insurer in addition to a professional service provider [1] . This is in contrast to the RPA, with which each member firm has to share 1 n of the total loss. 25 Using the result in Lemma 1, the MSSP's problem can be simplified as: Collective outsourcing occurs when all firms outsource their security management to the MSSP. Proposition 6 shows that in collective outsourcing, investment inefficiency caused by risk interdependency is addressed: The MSSP makes the security investment at the optimal level for all member firms. The optimal level is achieved because the investment decision making is shifted to one entity, so that network externalities are completely internalized. As a result, the investment inefficiency is eliminated.
Sustainability of Collective Outsourcing
Although collective outsourcing can lead to optimal security investments (made by the MSSP), whether this solution is incentive-compatible to individual firms is still unclear. The question is this: When all other firms use MSSs, does an individual firm have the incentive to defect from using the MSSs? When a firm defects, it has to manage security in-house, but it can still use cyberinsurance to hedge against its security risks. The payoff of the defecting firm can be considered as a firm's reservation payoff (outside option) when deciding on whether to use MSS (i.e., s U ). We next examine whether collective outsourcing is sustainable as an equilibrium for individual firms. For analysis tractability, we again assume that the security investments are additive [18] . In particular, 
Constraint (12) is an individual rationality (IR) constraint ensuring that a firm has a higher payoff when using MSSs than when managing security in-house and purchasing cyberinsurance.
This constraint requires that the MSSP establishes a fee that would not result in member firm defection. Lemma 2 characterizes the optimal service fee that the MSSP charges.
Lemma 2:
The optimal service fee charged by the MSSP satisfies that
The MSSP profits from the service fee. A for-profit MSSP charges a service fee that is as high as possible to maximize its profit, while still ensuring that firms are willing to use the MSS.
Suppose a firm defects. The total expected cost for IT security for the defecting firm is
, the cyberinsurance premium plus the security investment). The maximum service fee for the MSSs is therefore equal to the expected total security cost of the defecting firm, so that any firm is indifferent between defecting or not.
According to Eq. (11) and Lemma 2, the MSSP's profit is
For collective outsourcing to be viable, the MSSP must charge a fee that can cover its service cost. To derive additional insight, we use a general exponential breach probability (i.e., According to Lemma 2, the MSSP charges a fee equal to a defecting firm's security cost. This service fee not only ensures that all firms have incentives to use MSSs but also yields a positive profit for the MSSP. Therefore, the equilibrium of collective outsourcing using MSSs is sustainable when the condition in Proposition 7 holds.
The sustainability of collective outsourcing, although achievable with a small number of 28 firms, becomes increasingly difficult to achieve as the number of firms increases. When the number of firms is larger, an individual defecting firm gains more from the MSSP's collective operations. In the case of negative externalities, a larger number of firms provides the MSSP with more incentives to reduce the security investment to address the overinvestment issue for each member firm, making it easier for a defecting firm to beat the MSSP in security investment and drive hackers away. In the case of positive externalities, a larger number of firms induces the MSSP to increase the security investment to address the underinvestment issue for each member firm, making it easier for a defecting firm to free-ride. Therefore, an individual firm is more likely to defect, and the retention of all member firms is then more difficult for the MSSP. As a result, there is a maximum number of firms with which the MSSP can induce all firms to use the MSSs and address the investment inefficiency. Figure 2 demonstrates the maximum number of firms for which a sustainable equilibrium exists, given the degree of network externalities, b.
[Please Insert Figure 2 Here.]
The increase in the degree of network externalities generates two countervailing effects on firms' incentives to defect. In the case of negative externalities ( 0 b  ), when the degree of network externalities is higher ( b is smaller), the advantage of the MSS solution in internalizing externalities of the security investments is more evident, and a firm is more willing to use the MSSs. On the other hand, a firm also benefits more if it deviates from using the MSSs. This is because higher negative externalities induce the MSSP to invest less aggressively, and, as a result, it is easier for a defecting firm to beat the MSSP in security investment and drive hackers away. An individual firm is thus less willing to pay for MSSs, forcing the MSSP to lower the service fee. The fee that the MSSP can charge depends on the tradeoff between these two effects.
As a result, the maximum number of firms that ensures a sustainable equilibrium is first 29 increasing in b and then decreasing in b .
When the security investments generate positive externalities (i.e., 0 b  ), the defecting firm can free-ride on the MSSP's collective security operations for member firms. As a result, the MSSP has to keep the service fee low to retain the member firms. When the number of firms is larger, the benefit of free-riding is higher, and the service fee that the MSSP charges cannot cover the expected cost of serving a firm. As a result, collective outsourcing to the MSSP is a sustainable equilibrium only when 2 n  . It is worth noting that when security investments generate positive externalities and the MSSP is more cost-efficient, the maximum number of firms in a sustainable equilibrium may be higher than two, as is illustrated in the next section.
When 0 b  , the firms' security risks are independent, and security investments have no externalities. The service fee that the MSSP charges is equal to the security cost that the MSSP incurs to serve a member firm. As a result, the MSSP always makes zero profit (i.e., the condition in Proposition 7 never holds). This case is a trivial one.
MSSP's Cost Efficiency
The previous analysis presents a counterintuitive result: Even though the MSSP serving all firms invests at the optimal level and firms all benefit from security outsourcing, collective outsourcing to the MSSP might not arise as an equilibrium. This phenomenon occurs because a firm, even after defecting, might indirectly benefit from the MSSP's security operations, resulting in a higher payoff for the firm than actually using the MSSs. As a result, the MSSP cannot charge a fee that sustains collective outsourcing and results in a profit.
In practice, the MSSP is often more capable of managing security because of its better technology, more experienced staff, and higher operational efficiency. A major reason for which individual firms outsource security management is to leverage the MSSP's cost efficiency [1; 3] . 30 In this subsection, we examine how the MSSP's cost advantage is weakened by network externalities of security investments. We assume that the MSSP incurs an investment cost, 
When the MSSP is more cost-efficient than individual firms ( 01   ), the maximum number of firms yielding a collective outsourcing equilibrium depends on the level of cost efficiency ( ), in addition to the degree of network externalities ( b ). Figure 3 illustrates the maximum number of firms with which collective outsourcing arises as a sustainable equilibrium,
given the level of cost efficiency. Similar to the degree of network externalities, cost efficiency affects the firms' defection incentives through two countervailing effects. On the one hand, a more efficient MSSP ( is smaller) is more capable of managing the security risks than are individual firms. Therefore, an individual firm is more willing to use the MSSs. This is the 31 cost-efficiency effect. On the other hand, a defecting firm benefits more by taking advantage of the MSSP's collective security management when the MSSP is more cost-efficient. This effect decreases a firm's willingness to pay for the MSS. This is the defection effect. Figure 3 illustrates the maximum number of firms in a sustainable equilibrium when the MSSP is more cost efficient.
It shows that when the security investments generate positive externalities ( 0.1 b  ), the maximum number of firms in a collective outsourcing equilibrium is first increasing and then decreasing in  . When the security investments generate negative externalities ( 0.1 b  ), the cost-efficiency effect dominates the defection effect when the MSSP's cost-efficiency is high ( is small). Therefore, collective outsourcing is more likely to arise (i.e., all firms are willing to use the MSS) when  is small. 4 However, when  is large enough (i.e., the MSSP is less cost-efficient), the cost-efficiency effect is weakened and the maximum number of firms decreases to two.
[Please Insert Figure 3 Here.]
Heterogeneous Firms
In this paper, we follow the classic literature on risk pooling and focus on ex ante homogeneous firms. In this section, we extend the model and discuss the case that firms have heterogeneous security losses. In particular, we assume that there are two types of firms: type-1 firms and type-2 firms. In a security breach, a type-1 firm loses 1 L , and a type-2 firm loses 2 L , where 12 LL  . Let the total numbers of type-1 firms and type-2 firms be 1 n and 2 n , respectively. We have 12 n n n . 4 When 0.1 b  , the total number of firms must be no more than 10 to ensure that 1.. ,
When firms use cyberinsurance only, we can verify that a firm still overinvests when the security investments generate negative externalities, and underinvests when the security investments generate positive externalities. We next examine firms' security investments and expected payoffs in the RPA case. The expected payoff of a type-1 firm can be represented by: 
nn kj
And, the expected payoff of a type-2 firm can be represented by: 1  00  12  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2   1  00  12  22  2  2  2  2   2  22 , , , 
qq is the ratio of loss covered by the risk pool for type-1 firms (type-2 firms). Since the RPA is a mutual insurance organization and the participating firms equally share the loss as equity holders, the RPA covers the same amount of loss for all firms. We therefore focus on the case that 1 , , ,
, . ,1 nn kj . In addition, we let 8 A  , 1 6 L  , and 2 4 L  . We assume that type-1
firms account for about one-half of the firms. In particular, 12 2 n nn  when n is an even number and 12 1 nn  when n is an odd number. Figures 4(a) -(c) show the security investments, the firms' payoffs, and the ratios of loss coverage for type-1 and type-2 firms.
[Please Insert Figure 4 Here.] Figure 4 (a) shows the firms' security investments in the cyberinsurance-only case, the RPA case, and the optimal case when security investments generate negative externalities. The solid curves represent a type-1 firm's security investments, and the dash curves represent a type-2 firm's security investments. With heterogeneous firms, RPAs can still mitigate firms' overinvestment incentives. Both the type-1 firm' and type-2 firm's security investments in the 34 RPA case are significantly lower than their investments in the cyberinsurance-only case. Figure   4 (b) compares the firm's expected payoffs. The curves show that the firm's expected payoffs in the RPA case are higher than their payoffs in the cyberinsurance-only case. Figure 4 (c) illustrates the optimal ratios of loss covered by the risk pool for type-1 firms and type-2 firms. Similar to Figure 1(c) , the pool coverages increase as the number of firms in the pool increases. We also examined the case in which security investments generate positive network externalities and found that the RPA cannot address the underinvestment issues. All of the findings in the section of risk pooling arrangements hold qualitatively.
We then examine firms' security investments and expected payoffs in the MSS case. The MSSP's profit can be represented as 1 6 L  and 2 4 L  . In addition, 12 2 n nn  when n is an even number, and 12 1 nn  when n is an odd number.
[Please Insert Figure 5 Here.] Figure 5 shows that when the security investments generate negative externalities (i.e., It is worth noting that the use of a common increasing and concave utility function in this paper, although rooted in the risk management literature, could be potentially restrictive. In reality, the payoffs of heterogeneous firms may be better modeled using different functions. The present study is the first step to gaining insights in using alternative solutions to manage interdependent security risks. A thorough study of the alternative risk management solutions for heterogeneous firms deserves further research.
Discussion and Conclusion
The objective of security risk management is to appropriately use security resources to reduce firms' risk exposure. The risk management approaches considered in this paperthird-party 36 cyberinsurance, MSSs, and RPAsdiffer in their effectiveness in reducing risk exposure and inducing efficient security investments. Both cyberinsurance and MSSs provide complete risk transfer. As compared with cyberinsurance, MSSs induce more efficient allocation of security resources because the MSSP, when serving all firms, internalizes the externalities of security investments between the member firms. RPAs, in contrast, do not provide complete risk transfer.
However, they still help to induce more efficient security investments than cyberinsurance when security investments generate negative externalities. Both the internalization effect and the moral hazard effect associated with RPAs mitigate firms' overinvestment incentives.
In this paper, we focused on risk-averse firms. Note, however, that the analysis on the RPA and MSS solutions can also be applied to the case with risk-neutral firms, and all findings still hold. Even though the risk-neutral firms are indifferent to the choices of adopting cyberinsurance to hedge risks and bearing random losses, they might still be willing to adopt the solutions that address interdependent security risks. In particular, risk-neutral firms have incentives to use RPAs when the security investments generate negative externalities. In addition, MSSs can be used to address the investment inefficiency caused by interdependent risks; however, collective outsourcing to an MSSP is not sustainable when the number of firms is large. Risk-loving firms are likely to actively pursue risks to maximize their payoffs, and they are beyond the scope of this research.
In this paper, we assumed that the amount of loss is fixed in a security breach. If a firm's loss is a random amount in a security breach and the insurance company can specify a complete contingent insurance contract, a risk-neutral insurance company still provides full insurance to the risk-averse firm. In that case, the insurance company must be able to expect all loss contingencies and write the complete contingent contract, which details the compensation level 37 for each loss level. Similarly, the MSSP will offer full compensation for each loss level.
RPAs have traditionally been implemented in the forms of self-insurance, captives, risk retention groups, and pools to insure a wide variety of risks, such as medical practices, municipal liability, employee pension, and employee healthcare insurance. However, they have not been widely employed in the area of information security. Information security risks have the feature of risk interdependency, which challenges traditional risk management solutions and calls for alternative solutions. RPAs make firms share risks with one another within the pool and hence motivate firms to consider others' risks when making investment decisions. They thus have the potential to be an effective solution for interdependent risks in the area of information security.
RPAs' ability to address interdependent information security risks also makes their use desirable, even when firms are risk-neutral. Thus, we see another advantage of using RPAs in information security: They empower firms to actively control interdependent risks, in addition to hedging risks for risk-averse firms.
Additional advantages of using RPAs in information security include flexible policy development and larger capacity. Insurability of information security risks is often limited in the cyberinsurance market because of the lack of experience in dealing with new security risks.
RPAs allow the policy terms to be tailored to member firms and therefore to help cover new security risks. The cyberinsurance market is also limited in its capacity. RPAs could substantially increase the capacity of the risk management market, helping to insure against vast and ever-increasing information security risks.
Firms also face many operational challenges in implementing RPAs. In general, the process of implementation involves identifying the insurance coverages, determining premiums for the coverages, determining captive ownership and capitalization, identifying where the captive is 38 formed and regulated, issuing insurance policies, and managing claims [40] . Firms outside the insurance industry often lack experience in risk underwriting and claims management. Entering such a new business area would likely be very costly for them. In practice, insurance companies offer rent-a-captive services that provide firms with access to captive facilities. Thus, firms can use a rent-a-captive approach to establish and run their RPAs for information security risks. At the initial stage of implementation, a firm might start with a single-parent captive (i.e., an RPA within one firm) to manage security risks within its business units. Later, the firm might expand the RPA operation to the multi-firm context.
Regulatory restrictions pose additional challenges to the implementation of RPAs. The insurance market is highly regulated, and the development of RPAs is subject to regulatory attitudes. For example, in many jurisdictions, certain lines of insurance can be underwritten only by an admitted commercial insurer, not by a mutual insurer. Other factors affecting the adoption of RPAs include restrictions on the risk pool's underwriting terms, the deductibility of insurance premiums for corporate taxation purposes, and the risk pool's access to the reinsurance market.
Considering the potential that RPAs offer in coordinating firms' security investments, firms should actively promote RPAs to their regulatory agencies.
Security outsourcing enables firms to tap into the MSSP's security resources, skills, and capabilities. In practice, SLAs are often used in service outsourcing to specify performance expectations, establish accountability, and detail remedies or consequences if performance or service quality standards are not met [1] . In security outsourcing, SLAs enable firms to transfer the security risks to external service providers. In this regard, the MSSP serves not only as a service provider but also as an insurer. The MSSP takes into account the interaction between member firms when making security decisions for them. The MSS approach, therefore, 39 internalizes the externalities of security investments and provides a solution for interdependent security risks.
The MSS approach also provides a collective solution to create security protections that are difficult for individual firms to implement. For example, serving clients over different jurisdictions enables the MSSP to trace and collapse botnets, which are geographically distributed [32] . From individual firms' perspectives, devoting sufficient efforts to combat such distributed networks is often unwarranted. In this regard, MSSs can offer a potential approach for managing distributed and interdependent risks. The present study can be extended in many directions. First, we focused on the incentive-compatible solutions, and the proposed solutions help firms address the investment inefficiency issues and improve their security towards the optimal outcome. The findings in the present study provide useful managerial implications and insights. In the future, it would be desirable to investigate the incentive-compatible approaches that always yield the optimal 40 solution in the domain of information security. Second, we compared RPA and MSS solutions with cyberinsurance in addressing interdependent security risks. Future research might consider the interactions among the cyberinsurance, RPA, and MSS solutions. For example, the MSSP has better security skills than do the firms, in addition to cost advantages, and it may differentiate its services to better compete against the other two security management mechanisms. This is particularly important when firms are heterogeneous. The MSSP's service differentiation and competitive strategies in presence of heterogeneous firms merit in-depth study. Finally, future research might also study various implementation issues of the risk-management solutions. For example, the use of SLAs in security outsourcing requires firms to deploy various measures to monitor the MSSP's performance and enforce the contract terms. Reputation systems for MSSPs can be an effective mechanism to motivate the MSSP to behave properly in the long term. The design of diverse mutual insurance policies for different types of IT security risks deserves more Chubb's CyberSecurity, Hiscox's Hacker.
Self-insurance groups. 
